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Stormy Regulation: The Problems that  
Result when Stormwater (and Other) 
Regulatory Programs Neglect to Account for 
Limitations in Scientific and  
Technical Information 
Wendy E. Wagner* 
On paper, the regulation of stormwater discharges in the 
United States appears to be a massive and growing enterprise.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) website educating 
the public and regulated parties about its extensive stormwater 
requirements provides dozens of reports, including detailed engi-
neering assessments, best practices options, fact sheets, and EPA 
guidance documents, some of which are so enormous that they 
are almost too large to download.1  Federal stormwater regula-
tory requirements involve two separate phases, multiple catego-
ries of regulated parties—each of which enjoys individualized 
treatment—and menus of best management practices (BMPs) to 
fit virtually any type of land use that creates polluted stormwa-
ter.2  The EPA is currently in the midst of promulgating a revised 
“NPDES Stormwater Multi-Sector General Permit for Industrial 
Activities” (MSGP),3 one of almost a dozen separate stormwater 
permit programs.4  The stormwater regulatory program is so 
substantial that private companies have formed to help regulated 
parties navigate the requirements.5  State and local programs 
only magnify the growing complexity.  The State of California, 
                                                 
* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor, University of Texas School of Law.  Please 
direct comments to WWagner@law.utexas.edu.  Many thanks to Xavier Swamikannu for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft and to participants at the Chapman symposium and 
the editors of the Chapman Law Review, particularly MacKenzie Batzer, for valuable 
feedback and editorial assistance. 
1 See EPA, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=6 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
2 See, e.g., EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM (June 
1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf [hereinafter EPA, OVERVIEW 
OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM]. 
3 EPA, NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES), PROPOSED 
2006 MSGP, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/msgp2006_all-proposed.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2006). [hereinafter EPA, 2006 MSGP]. 
4 See infra n.86 Figure 2. 
5 See, e.g., StormwaterAuthority, http://www.stormwaterauthority.org (last visited Feb. 6, 
2006). 
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Riverside County, and other locales in California add still an-
other layer of implementing requirements on top of the EPA’s 
unwieldy regulatory base.6 
The million dollar question, though, is whether all of these 
regulations and guidance documents succeed in actually control-
ling this important source of water pollution.  The federal Clean 
Water Act stormwater permit program regulates only a subset of 
all sources of stormwater runoff—those that occur at identified 
facilities, municipalities, and large construction sites.7  But the 
contribution of pollutants from these larger stormwater sources 
appears to make up a significant portion of polluted runoff in ur-
ban watersheds.8  The effectiveness of the EPA’s stormwater 
permit program is thus an important piece in the larger puzzle of 
assessing the adequacy of current legal responses to the problem 
of urban runoff. 
This article argues that the potential for success of this large 
and growing stormwater discharge program—at least as it is im-
plemented at the federal level—is doubtful.  The basis for this 
skepticism is not specific to the stormwater program.  Instead, 
the stormwater regulatory program is illustrative of a larger 
problem that has plagued most environmental regulatory pro-
grams over the last thirty-five years: these programs are de-
signed in ways that neglect to account for dramatic limits in sci-
entific and technical information.  Limitations in information 
constrain the options available to regulators to police the release 
of pollution or the manufacture of dangerous products.  If regula-
tions are designed in blatant disregard of these information con-
straints—for example, the fact that regulated parties often enjoy 
privately held, technical information regarding the risks posed by 
their products or activities—the programs are headed for trouble. 
Behind this critique of the stormwater regulatory program, 
then, is a more general argument about regulation—namely that 
limitations in scientific and technical information cannot simply 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., Storm Water Protection Program, The Cities and County of Riverside 
ONLY RAIN IN THE STORM DRAIN Pollution Prevention Program, http://www. 
floodcontrol.co.riverside.ca.us/stormwater/ (last visited May 12, 2006).  For a list of all 
Phase I municipal stormwater permits issued in the state of California, go to State Water 
Resources Control Board Water Quality, Storm Water Program,  http://www.waterboards. 
ca.gov/stormwtr/phase_i_municipal.html (last visited May 12, 2006). 
7 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000); National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47990 (1990) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122–24 (1990). 
8 See EPA, EPA NO. 821-R-99-012, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY OF URBAN 
STORMWATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 4-23 (Aug. 1999), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/ost/stormwater/usw_b.pdf [hereinafter EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY]. 
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be accommodated after a regulatory program has been estab-
lished.  We cannot decide, for example, that we want all waters 
fishable and swimmable or the air safe for all persons and then 
figure out how science can get us there.  Instead, competent regu-
latory design requires an assessment of what science and other 
sources of technical information can and cannot offer—at the 
front end of regulatory design.  Limits in available information 
should inform both the ends and the means of how we choose to 
regulate.  Such a front-end assessment of the available technical 
and scientific information is likely to lead to regulatory programs 
that look quite different from the programs currently in place, in-
cluding the federal program regulating stormwater discharges. 
The argument that the stormwater regulatory program ig-
nores important limits in available information unfolds in three 
parts.  Part I makes the larger argument that successful envi-
ronmental regulation must consider the limits of available scien-
tific information and design regulatory requirements around 
those constraints rather than trying to address these limitations 
at the back-end, after the program has been established.  Exam-
ples from several regulatory programs make it clear that this 
oversight is neither new nor isolated to the stormwater runoff 
program.  Part II then outlines the specific types of information 
constraints that plague stormwater regulation and identifies how 
the EPA’s design of the stormwater discharge regulatory pro-
gram neglects these constraints and, at some level, seems to 
flaunt them.  While the failure of the stormwater program to 
adequately account for and design its regulatory program around 
these information constraints may not devastate the program, 
these failures will likely reduce its effectiveness considerably, 
particularly in areas where local or state governments are not 
enthusiastic about reinforcing the program with more stringent 
requirements.  Part III closes the article on a more hopeful note 
by suggesting some opportunities to redesign the federal storm-
water program to better take into account the information that is 
and is not available to regulators.  While these proposals are not 
a panacea for this very challenging field of regulation, they are 
likely to be more successful than the current federal program. 
I.  INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
It is well-established that science is pivotal to most environ-
mental regulation.  It is also well-established that the supply of 
this scientific and technical information is far less than is needed 
to produce effective or comprehensive regulations of man-made 
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harms.9  Despite these well-settled truths in environmental regu-
lation, there seems to be little effort to apply them in the practice 
of regulatory design.  Some of this neglect is forgivable—a fair 
number of our programs have their origins in the early 1970’s 
when regulators were still learning by trial and error.  But some 
of the worst offenses—a category that includes stormwater regu-
latory programs that began in earnest in the 1990’s—are far 
more recent and should have been designed in ways that bene-
fited from past mistakes. 
A.  Information Constraints in Environmental  
Regulation—The Theory 
The idea that information can be limited and that policy 
analysis and decision-making models must account for these 
limitations is a relatively new innovation.  Economists Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, George A. Akerlof, and A. Michael Spence were awarded 
the Nobel Prize in 2001 for their groundbreaking research on 
asymmetrical information in markets.10  As a result of their 
work, “much of what economists believed—what they thought to 
be true on the basis of research and analysis over almost a cen-
tury—turned out not to be robust to considerations of even slight 
imperfections [otherwise known as asymmetries] of informa-
tion.”11  Economists are now forced to change their assumptions 
based on the discoveries that information asymmetries can affect 
institutional and individual behavior in important ways. 
At a theoretical level, then, we now understand that limita-
tions in information can impose significant and sometimes in-
surmountable roadblocks to particular ways of doing things.  
This does not mean that existing regulatory programs are 
doomed to fail.  It does mean that successful regulatory design 
must first identify the limitations in scientific and technical in-
formation that exist and then develop the regulatory program 
around these constraints. 
In environmental regulation, there are at least three differ-
ent types of significant limitations in information that occur with 
regularity and must be accommodated in regulatory design.  
First, there is the familiar problem of “uncertain information” 
that involves scientific and technical questions that are unlikely 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Envi-
ronmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926, 1926 (2003). 
10 See Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/index.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2006). 
11 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth 
Century Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON.1441, 1461 (2000) (emphasis omitted). 
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to have immediate or even short-term answers.12  Some of this 
uncertainty is due to limitations of scientific knowledge.  Scien-
tists do not understand mechanisms of carcinogenicity, hormone 
interactions, or neurological effects sufficiently to explain or pre-
dict how chemicals will interact in humans or animals.13  Some of 
the uncertainty is also due to resource constraints.  Even with 
the limited scientific knowledge we do possess, we often lack re-
sources to conduct basic tests or conduct extensive monitoring to 
resolve uncertainties relevant to regulation.  For example, com-
prehensive monitoring of the environment would tell us some-
thing and perhaps a great deal about environmental quality, but 
it is exceedingly expensive and we lack the resources to conduct 
most of it.14 
A second type of information constraint results from asym-
metric or “imperfect information.”15  Some information may be 
available, or nearly so, only it lies with certain parties who are 
disinclined to share it.16  The problems of asymmetrical informa-
tion are substantial in regulating private actors, and as elabo-
rated later, they are particularly significant in stormwater regu-
lation.  Many regulated actors sit atop “mountains of detailed 
facts” about the nature of their polluting activities and “amass 
specialized private expertise about the ways these activities” and 
land uses could introduce pollutants into the environment.17  
Since their property is private, access to information about the 
pollutants that might be present in stormwater runoff is gener-
ally not available to neighbors or regulators unless these groups 
are granted permission to enter the site, and even then, pollut-
ants may not be readily apparent in a visual inspection.18  Even 
to the extent that these regulated parties do not have direct in-
                                                 
12 See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1742 
(2004). 
13 See, e.g., COMM. ON HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENV’T ET AL., 
HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 1–7 (1999) (identifying great scien-
tific unknowns for hormonally active agents, including mechanisms of action, and identi-
fying several major areas for needed future research). 
14 See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES FOR EPA ET AL., 
BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR SOUND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 19, 21, 25, 31 (1997) 
(discussing in concrete terms the drastic need for basic monitoring and citing other EPA 
studies similarly concluding that there is a need for better environmental monitoring). 
15 See Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, The Polluter Pays Versus the Pollutee Pays Princi-
ple Under Asymmetric Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 69, 69 (1998). 
16 See, e.g., id. at 71 (assuming that a polluter has asymmetric information on the 
benefits of the polluting activity). 
17 Wagner, supra note 12, at 1641–42. 
18 See Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Spe-
cies Policy on Private Land with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22, 
26–29 (1998) (discussing the asymmetrical advantages that private owners enjoy with re-
spect to the presence of endangered species on their land). 
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formation about the nature of the stormwater pollution problems 
at their site, they are generally in a far better position to obtain 
information about the effects of their activities than others.19  
Regulated parties know approximately where or what to sample 
and what present or past practices might deserve closer inspec-
tion, even though they may not have yet done the research.  Ac-
tors thus also have superior access to information because they 
have an “inside track” on where to obtain it and what to look 
for.20 
The third type of science constraint arises while scientific re-
search or information is still emerging (called “emergent infor-
mation”) and has not been fully vetted or accepted by the scien-
tific community.21  In the peculiar setting of regulatory controls, 
some of this emergent information about toxicity or environ-
mental quality will not be welcome by a large and influential sec-
tor of the affected interests—namely regulated parties.22  In-
stead, it will be hotly contested.23  Given the evolving nature of 
scientific discoveries and the loose system of scientific govern-
ance that presides over these discoveries, there is no quick and 
dirty way for regulators to judge the point at which this develop-
ing science is reliable enough to form the basis for regulatory 
controls.24  The fact that the information is likely to be hotly con-
tested extends the time during which scientific research can, in 
practice, actually inform regulatory programs and constitutes 
another information constraint.25  As a result, even when useful 
scientific information is produced, the adversarial nature of the 
legal system may lead to extensive contests over the reliability of 
that information for years before it is accepted as reliable for 
purposes of regulation. 
In designing a regulatory program, in theory, one would first 
identify the types of information needed to establish and meet 
regulatory goals.  Next, one would assess the extent to which this 
needed information is handicapped by one or more of these types 
of constraints.  If the information is effectively unavailable be-
cause it is uncertain, asymmetric, or contested, then it is critical 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 1641–49. 
21 See Timothy Caulfield, The Mass Media’s Influence on Health Law and Policy: 
Symposium: Popular Media, Biotechnology, and the “Cycle of Hype,” 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 213, 220 (2005). 
22 See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regula-
tory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System, 
13 J.L. & POL’Y 17, 17–18 (2005). 
23 Id. 
24 See THOMAS MCGARITY & WENDY WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE ch. 3 (Jan. 9, 2006) 
(book in progress, on file with author). 
25 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 12, at 1649–59. 
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to devise a regulatory strategy that finds a way around these 
constraints.  For example, a common problem in many pollution 
control programs is their failure to anticipate and work around 
substantial asymmetries in information between the regulated 
and the regulators.26  Regulatory parties often enjoy far more in-
formation and access to information about their potential health 
or environmental harms than regulators.27  Yet many regulatory 
programs ignore these prevalent information asymmetries and 
place the burden on regulators to discover health and environ-
mental risks.  Our current regulatory programs governing the 
filling of wetlands,28 fugitive sources of toxic air pollution,29 the 
discovery of contaminated land,30 and the manufacture and sale 
of chemicals31 all fall prey to this particular blind spot.  By failing 
to take the asymmetrical information of the regulated party into 
account, they establish regulatory regimes that are barely en-
forceable and can lead to substantial noncompliance.  Similarly, a 
regulatory program that expects existing scientific research and 
data to magically reveal the point at which a pesticide presents 
“unreasonable adverse effects,”32 when air pollutants are con-
trolled sufficiently to “allow[] an adequate margin of safety [to] 
                                                 
26 Id. at 1641–42. 
27 Id. 
28 Under current law, wetland developers are not required to conduct research on 
the wetlands they hope to fill to show that they are not environmentally valuable. See 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2001). On the contrary, opponents to the development must bear 
the burden of conducting this research, even though the land is often privately held and 
its owners can deny the access needed for research. 
29 Federal Clean Air Act regulations provide facilities with fugitive sources of air 
toxins wide latitude in self-monitoring their compliance with required pollution control 
equipment. Under the regulations, a facility is required to self-inspect to ensure compli-
ance with technology-based requirements for fugitive emissions sources only at specified 
intervals, sometimes as infrequently as once per year. See Storage Vessel Provisions—
Procedures to Determine Compliance, 40 C.F.R. § 63.120(a) (2004) (requiring visual in-
spections only once annually for storage vessels). When a facility catches its own viola-
tion, there is a period of time during which the facility can repair the problem without 
penalty. Under some fugitive pollution rules, this excused repair time can be as long as 
forty-five days.  See 40 C.F.R. § 63.120(a)(4) (2004). 
30 Actors owning land that leaches toxic substances onto neighboring land, into pub-
lic recreational resources, or into other water supplies (including drinking water sup-
plies), are effectively immunized from reporting their pollution if the amount “appears” 
smaller than the reportable quantities defined by regulations.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (2000) (requiring reports of spills of oil and hazardous substances 
only above a threshold amount and, even then, only from vessels or facilities, thus exclud-
ing runoff); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000) (requiring reports of releases of hazardous substances 
only if they exceed a “reportable quantity”).  The contamination may only be discovered if 
a governmental entity or other third party identifies the problem. 
31 See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing 
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1813 (1989) (noting that there is 
currently little incentive for chemical manufacturers to undergo expensive testing merely 
to point out the flaws in their own products). 
32  7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (2000). 
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protect the public health,”33 or when surface waters are suffi-
ciently free from pollutants to ensure protection of “the public 
health or welfare,”34 is setting itself up for failure.35  Regulated 
parties will not only contest the science that exists to answer 
these questions, but regulators will find tremendous uncertain-
ties that lack clear answers.  For example, Dr. Ken Reckhow, the 
Department Chair at Duke University’s Nicholas School for the 
Environment, has found that water quality modeling—in the ab-
sence of extensive supporting water quality data—is often so er-
ror-laden that it might not produce information that is useful at 
all.36  Many regulatory programs, including the Total Maximum 
Daily Load (TMDL) program of the Clean Water Act do not ap-
preciate these severe information constraints.37  Instead, by in-
sisting that regulatory requirements be based on scientific mod-
els that are often badly data-deprived and laden with theoretical 
uncertainties, these programs encounter decades of contested 
science and resultant regulatory paralysis.38 
B.    Information Constraints in Environmental  
Regulation—The Practice 
Although the bad examples—where regulatory programs fail 
to account for prevailing information constraints—far outnumber 
the good examples, the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) program governing indus-
trial effluent conveniently provides a particularly good example 
of a regulatory program that accounts for several critical infor-
mation constraints in its regulatory design.39  In devising the 
NPDES program of the Clean Water Act, Congress reacted to the 
substantial uncertainties and imperfections in scientific informa-
tion that plagued its past efforts to regulate water pollution, and 
developed a program that circumvents these constraints.40 
                                                 
33  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). 
34  33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
35 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999). 
36 K. H. Reckhow & S. C. Chapra, Modeling Excessive Nutrient Loading in the Envi-
ronment, 100 ENVTL. POLLUTION 197, 206 (1999) (discussing problems in water quality 
modeling, much of which stem from inadequate data, and concluding that “it should not 
be surprising that theoretically based improvements in a model often cannot be supported 
with the limited available observational data”). 
37 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10469, 10474-79 (1999) (detailing the series of scientific obstacles that arise in the TMDL 
program). 
38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 92–911, at 396 (1972) (statement of Rep. Charles Rangel) (ob-
serving that “the history of our water pollution control program suggests that State and 
Federal governments will continue to founder on the staggering complexity of this control 
system, which requires working mathematically back from the permitted pollution levels 
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As a scientific matter, when the Clean Water Act was passed 
in 1972 and to a large extent today, scientists are able to tell us 
very little about how much pollution a water body could assimi-
late before encountering significant ecological damage or present-
ing serious health risks.41  Even when policymakers set a nu-
meric concentration for a particular pollutant—a level of 
acceptable dioxin in rivers and lakes in Virginia, for example—
scientists cannot assure us that the level of discharges that can 
be tolerated from various point sources, much less the nonpoint 
sources, in order to keep the water quality at roughly that ac-
ceptable level.42 
Yet despite these and many other unknowns, Congress re-
fused to become paralyzed by the scientific and technical con-
straints that plague water pollution regulation.43  One thing that 
is clear scientifically—both in 1972 and today—is that water pol-
lution is significant, presenting both health threats and ecologi-
cal damage.44  Scientists have discovered 362 toxins in Great 
Lakes water, sediment, and biota; this discovery tells us that 
man-made impacts are impairing lake ecosystems.45  Alterations 
in the diversity and types of species inhabiting some streams in-
dicate water quality impairments.46  Swimmers recreating near 
sewer outfalls experience higher levels of respiratory and other 
maladies than swimmers recreating further downstream.47  At an 
aggregate level, then, there is little question that serious im-
pairments to some waters result from pollutant loading and that 
reducing those loadings will make a positive difference to human 
and ecological health. 
In order to implement this general scientific knowledge 
without hanging up the regulatory program on the scores of more 
specific water quality unknowns, Congress devised an ingenious 
system that simply required—in very specific and enforceable 
ways—that at least those actors discharging wastes into water 
                                                                                                                 
in a waterway to the effluent limitations at the point source needed to achieve them”). 
41 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from 
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 211–12 (1999) (discussing some of the 
scientific uncertainties in setting water quality criteria); Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation 
of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10528, 10529–31 (1991) 
(detailing a series of major scientific uncertainties encountered in the effort to set ambi-
ent water quality standards that must be squarely addressed in order to arrive at a final 
standard). 
42 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 37, at 10472. 
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (2000). 
44 See, e.g., EPA, The Effects of Great Lakes Contaminants on Human Health, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/health/atsdr-ref.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
45 See, e.g., id. 
46 See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-35 to 4-36, 4-39 to 
4-43. 
47 See, e.g., id. at 4-44 to 4-47. 
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through a pipe “do their best” to reduce pollution.48  This re-
quirement circumvented one of the major information constraints 
that plagues many other regulatory systems—the problem of sci-
entific uncertainties.  In its regulatory design, Congress resisted 
the need to get specific answers for the point at which waters 
were degraded or the types of regulatory controls that would be 
needed to clean them up.49  Instead, this “do our best” or technol-
ogy-based pollution control approach simply requires the main 
dischargers to limit their loadings to what regulators determine 
is technologically feasible.50 
Congress also directly confronted the problems of asymmet-
ric information enjoyed by regulated parties in designing the 
NPDES program.51  Industrial dischargers have superior knowl-
edge of what “doing their best” encompasses and whether they 
are actually accomplishing that “best” on a daily basis.  Rather 
than task poor regulators with the job of checking on the repre-
sentations of regulated parties that they are minimizing their 
pollution loads, Congress also instructed the EPA to find out—on 
an industry-by-industry basis—what doing one’s best actually 
was and to put that result into a single numerical effluent stan-
dard that applied to all similar industries.52  In this way, the 
regulator would have the burden of devising categorical industry 
effluent limits, but once put in place, there would no longer be 
the need for regulators to become familiar with the capabilities of 
individual dischargers in order to finalize permit requirements.53 
An even more brilliant element of the NPDES program is the 
self-monitoring requirement.  Because dischargers have consid-
erable asymmetrical information regarding whether they are in 
compliance with generic effluent limits, Congress, with the help 
of the EPA, devised a scheme whereby all regulated parties 
                                                 
48 See Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing 
Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 
199 n.194 (1983) (quoting Senator Bayh as explaining that the technology-based stan-
dards adopted in the 1972 Clean Water Act were intended to “force industry to do the best 
job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to keep making progress without incurring 
such massive costs that economic chaos would result.”) (citing Senate Comm. on Pub. 
Works, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1133 (1973)); see generally 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A) 
(2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)-(3) (2000). 
49 Michael R. Bosse, George J. Mitchell: Maine’s Environmental Senator, 47 ME. L. 
REV. 179, 184 (1995) (“Congress’s intent is to reevaluate environmental statutes such as 
the Clean Water Act periodically to ensure that the law reflects the current state of ongo-
ing scientific knowledge and changing circumstances.”). 
50 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
51 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1)–(3) (2000). 
52 See, e.g., Du Pont v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977). 
53 John H. Minan, Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System (MS4) Regulation Under 
the Federal Clean Water Act: The Role of Water Quality Standards?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1215, 1232 n.95 (2005). 
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would monitor their own effluent at regular intervals.54  While 
some asymmetries in information remain and their existence un-
dercuts compliance,55 the private informational advantages of the 
discharger are generally overcome by this regulatory scheme: 
dischargers have few choices but to monitor their effluent hon-
estly and to disclose those effluent numbers to regulators and the 
public at large.56 
In short, the NPDES program circumvents the largest prob-
lems of uncertain and imperfect information.  Once the effluent 
standards were promulgated, this left the EPA with a regulatory 
program that could be implemented relatively smoothly—at least 
in comparison to science-dependent regulatory programs.  More-
over, the likelihood of regulated parties holding up the program 
by contesting emerging scientific information is also circum-
vented since scientific information is generally not relevant to 
this technology-based standard-setting and permitting process.57 
But the NPDES program governing industrial effluent is 
hardly perfect.  It was so skillful in circumventing the need for 
scientific information that it neglected to develop mechanisms for 
collecting water quality data that might enable more science-
intensive regulation in the future.58  The “do your best” standard, 
in fact, will not achieve even the most primitive water quality ob-
jectives (sight and smell) in some settings where a water body 
cannot assimilate numerous industrial discharges that enter the 
water at once.59  Thus, the need for some second-tier, science-
based form of regulation was inevitable, but was not established 
in a coherent way.  However, with this one important exception, 
the NPDES program exemplifies smart regulatory design, at 
                                                 
54 See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (2000). 
55 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-21, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT: EPA CANNOT ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF SELF-REPORTED COMPLIANCE 
MONITORING DATA (Mar. 1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/149103.pdf [herein-
after GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT] (finding that sampling methods employed by 
regulated parties were not reviewed by EPA inspectors in roughly two-thirds of the states 
surveyed, enabling regulated parties’ accidental errors or deliberately falsified results to 
remain undetected). 
56 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 
U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 101–03 (2000). 
57 Id. at 1651–53 (noting that when science-based standards are used, the strategy 
employed by many regulated parties is to discredit the science behind the standard: “In 
some cases, because of the inherent complexity of the studies, even if high-quality techni-
cal research can be at least temporarily discredited by making groundless challenges 
about the methods used, the reliability of the data collected, the qualifications of the re-
searcher conducting the study, or by suggesting that the review processes are flawed.”). 
58 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 69, 84-85 (1988). 
59 It is obviously difficult to set water quality control standards when there are mul-
tiple sources of pollution entering a single body of water at once. See, e.g., Esther Bartfeld, 
Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 
74 (1993). 
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least with regard to its maneuverability around significant in-
formation constraints.  In fact, critics of the program have been 
far too quick to overlook the severity of information constraints 
and the program’s effectiveness in overcoming them.60 
II.  FEDERAL STORMWATER DISCHARGE REGULATIONS:  
THE NEGLECT OF THE INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS 
Stormwater discharge regulation is set within this larger 
NPDES program that governs industrial effluent discharges and 
ranks among the best at identifying and working around poten-
tially fatal significant science constraints.61  But the extension of 
the NPDES program to the regulation of stormwater discharges 
neglects the underlying information constraints that explain why 
the NPDES program developed in the way it did.  As a result, 
stormwater regulation ironically runs headlong into precisely the 
same types of information constraints that the NPDES program 
was designed to avoid. 
A.  Background: The Science and Law of Stormwater  
Discharge Regulation 
The regulation of stormwater runoff confronts the same sci-
entific constraints that plague controlling pollutants in industrial 
effluent, but encounters added uncertainties in quantifying the 
variable pollutant loads that occur in runoff.  At the same time, 
much like the traditional NPDES program, those in charge of the 
land or outfalls that carry the runoff into the waters enjoy con-
siderable private information or access to information about the 
types of problems that might be occurring at their sites.62 
1. Additional Uncertainties in Characterizing  
Stormwater Runoff 
As is the case for industrial discharges, there are large scien-
tific uncertainties involved in attempting to trace specific sources 
of stormwater runoff to individual environmental or health 
harms.  While broad scientific connections can be made (i.e., fecal 
coliform loadings do not make for good swimming conditions), it 
has been difficult to move beyond these very general correlations 
between pollution and public health and environmental harms.63  
                                                 
60 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 328–30 (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environ-
mental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–37 (1985). 
61 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 56, at 96–97. 
62 See generally GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 55 (explaining 
the EPA’s use of self-reporting for monitoring compliance and also under the wastewater 
discharge and hazardous waste programs). 
63 See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-44 to 4-47. 
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Scientists have, however, attributed significant adverse water 
quality consequences to cumulative stormwater runoff.64  Given 
the role of precipitation in mobilizing many of the pollutants, 
stormwater loadings are obviously far more variable than tradi-
tional industrial sources; this runoff includes some very toxic 
substances and large amounts of sediment that impair water 
quality.65  Scientists have also identified major sources of pollut-
ants in stormwater runoff that include motor vehicle exhaust, 
construction activities, industrial operations, and suburban lawn 
products like fertilizers and pesticides.66 
But there are some added uncertainties that affect the regu-
lation of stormwater runoff.  First, measuring the effectiveness of 
site controls designed to minimize pollutants in stormwater run-
off is considerably less certain than isolating the effluent pollu-
tion control gains made at an industrial operation as a result of 
installing the best pollution control technology.67  In the indus-
trial effluent NPDES program, the EPA was able to identify an 
industry “average” within a category—like an average iron 
manufacturer that makes iron using a blast furnace—and then 
quantify the pollutants in the effluent of that average factory if it 
installs the best available pollution control technology.68  Al-
though there are inevitable error bars surrounding these average 
effluent limitations, the error bars remain sufficiently small and 
most facilities are still able to comply with the promulgated ef-
fluent limits.  By contrast, the error bars and uncertainties sur-
rounding the pollution control capabilities of various BMPs for 
any given industrial site, construction site or municipal storm 
sewer are far larger and could vary substantially from one prop-
erty to another.69  Natural causes of variation in the pollutant 
loads in stormwater runoff include the topography of a site, the 
soil conditions, and of course, the nature of storm flows in inten-
sity, frequency, and volume.70  In addition, the manner in which 
the facility stores and uses materials, the amount of impervious 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., id. at 4-48; EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1994 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 24 (1994), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/owow/305b/94report/nat_sum.pdf (noting the significant contributions 
of pollution that stormwater runoff makes and attributing 46 percent of the identified 
cases of water quality impairment in estuaries to storm sewer runoff). 
65 See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-6. 
66 See, e.g., id. at 4-9. 
67 See, e.g., EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EPA/600/R-04/184, THE 
USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPS) IN URBAN WATERSHEDS 4-2 (Sept. 2004), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ordntrnt/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/600r04184/600r04184.htm [hereinaf-
ter EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES]. 
68 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 420.33(a) (2004). 
69 See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5-15 
to 5-17. 
70 Id. at 5-12 to 5-15. 
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cover, and sometimes even what materials the facility uses can 
vary and affect pollutant loads in runoff from one site to an-
other.71  Together these sources of variability—particularly the 
natural features—make it much more difficult to identify or pre-
dict a meaningful “average” pollutant load of stormwater runoff 
from a facility that adopts BMPs for the site.72 
Second, the impediments to measuring the actual amounts of 
pollutants present in runoff contribute still more uncertainty to 
stormwater runoff controls.  Because stormwater runoff is so 
variable over time and space, it is difficult to gauge a site’s pol-
lutant contributions through a single grab sample.73  Indeed, 
monitors would need to take almost continuous samples of the 
runoff whenever it rained because of fluctuations in pollutant 
loadings over the course of a storm event.74  Yet the costs of this 
type of monitoring could be substantial, and since the pollution is 
from runoff, rather than industrial effluent, the regulated owners 
and facilities may be less prepared to absorb these additional 
costs or pass them on to customers in the form of their products 
or services.75  Monitoring runoff is thus less practicable than 
monitoring effluent from an industrial facility and adds further 
uncertainties to the evaluation of how well BMPs and other site 
controls are working. 
The asymmetries in information regarding the types of pol-
lutants in stormwater runoff appear roughly the same as the 
asymmetries in information regarding industrial effluent.  The 
owner or operator of a parcel of land has the best and perhaps 
the only access to information on the extent to which the land 
has been disturbed, the types of sealant used on the asphalt, the 
materials that have been disposed of on the land, and other ac-
tivities that could affect the pollutants in runoff.  The owners, in 
other words, enjoy asymmetrical information or at least superior 
                                                 
71 See generally id. at 4-2 (recognizing the impact of related variables on accurate 
BMP monitoring). 
72 See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 
4-2 (providing that “a wide variety of underlying conditions may exist, making a one-size-
fits-all approach to BMP monitoring infeasible”). 
73 See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4-2; 
EPA, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, EPA/625/R-93/004, HANDBOOK: URBAN 
RUNOFF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL PLANNING, ch. 5  (Sept. 1993), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/pubs/625r93004/625r93004.pdf [hereinafter EPA, HANDBOOK]. 
74 See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 
4-2 (suggesting that the “temporal and spacial variation concerning stormwater pollutant 
loads” complicates collection to the degree that multiple grabs may be necessary in order 
to ensure accuracy of BMPs). 
75 Cf. Chris A. Mattison, New Storm Water Regulations Affect Municipalities and 
Smaller Construction Operations, 29 COLO. LAW. 71, 75 (Feb. 2000) (referencing the costs 
of compliance with federal stormwater regulations and suggesting that they might be too 
high for some regulated parties). 
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access to this information that helps characterize the nature of 
the pollutant loading occurring through storm runoff.  The owner 
also best knows what it will take to minimize these releases, or 
at least can generally discover this information most cheaply. 
Thus, in stormwater discharge control, existing asymmetries 
in information regarding the types of pollutants that might be re-
leased into runoff are compounded by scientific uncertainties, 
making it nearly impossible for the EPA to a reliable, external 
measure of the types of pollutants that are actually being re-
leased from the site through stormwater runoff.  The inability to 
easily measure pollution in runoff makes it difficult to know pre-
cisely what a landowner should do differently or whether newly-
installed pollution controls are working.  These added uncertain-
ties make it much more difficult to oversee private owners’ con-
tributions to runoff pollution. 
2.  The Federal Stormwater NPDES Program 
Despite the scientific differences between regulating indus-
trial effluent discharged from a factory and the stormwater dis-
charge that collects from a street, an industrial lot, or a construc-
tion site, the Clean Water Act (and the EPA) generally treats 
them the same.76  This similar treatment of industrial and 
stormwater discharges is in part a historical/legal artifact: both 
types of discharges often occur through “discrete conveyances” 
and thus fall legally into the same regulatory category of “point 
sources.”77  This similar treatment is also the likely result of con-
venience.  The NPDES system is well-established and has been 
relatively successful; therefore, sweeping one more type of pipe 
within this system leads to the least amount of political backlash 
and bureaucratic upheaval. 
                                                 
76 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
77 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
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In practice, however, merging the two programs has caused 
the EPA to force-fit stormwater regulation into the industrial ef-
fluent model.  Rather than identifying the obvious differences in 
the scientific uncertainties between these two pollution programs 
and coming up with new approaches that circumvent the added 
uncertainties that afflict stormwater, the EPA applies the old 
NPDES model to stormwater runoff in cookie-cutter fashion.78  
When extending the NPDES model to stormwater runoff requires 
adjustments, the EPA reaches for the most obvious analog, with-
out any apparent awareness of the added information constraints 
that arise in its modified program. 
As Figure 1 shows, the stormwater NPDES program tracks 
the traditional industrial effluent NPDES program step-by-step, 
despite the significant differences between the information con-
straints that afflict the programs.79  First, like its industrial ef-
fluent prototype, the stormwater NPDES program lists a number 
of “covered” sources that are officially included in the program 
and expects these sources to self-identify themselves and apply 
                                                 
78 See supra Figure 1. 
79 See supra Figure 1. 
Figure 1: A Step-by-Step Comparison of the NPDES Industrial 
Effluent Program with the NPDES Stormwater Program 





Step 1: Identify Regu-
lated Sources 
Legally covered sources 
self-identify and insert 
themselves in the system. 
Legally covered sources 
self-identify and insert 
themselves in the system. 
Step 2: Identify Compli-
ance Requirements 
Numeric effluent limits 
are promulgated in the 
C.F.R. 
Sources identify best 
management practices for 
their sites and develop 
plans that describe how 
they will establish and 
maintain the practices. 
Step 3: Self-Monitor to 
Ensure Compliance 
Sources must self-monitor 
their effluent regularly, if 
not continuously, and 
submit results to the 
agency in the form of 
monthly discharge moni-
toring reports. 
Sources self-monitor their 
compliance by conducting 
periodic onsite inspections 
and keeping records of 
those inspections.    In 
some cases, self-moni-
toring includes sampling 
runoff annually or quar-
terly, but the discharger 
enjoys considerable dis-
cretion in sampling. 
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for a permit.80  The EPA’s federal stormwater discharge program 
is divided into two phases that encompass increasingly smaller 
sources of stormwater discharges.81  The first phase—finalized in 
1990—regulates stormwater discharges from ten types of indus-
trial operations (this includes the entire manufacturing sector), 
construction occurring on more than five acres, and medium or 
large storm sewers in areas that serve more than 100,000 peo-
ple.82  The second phase—finalized in 1995—includes smaller 
municipal storm sewer systems and smaller construction sites 
(down to one acre).83  If these covered sources fail to apply for a 
permit, they are in violation of the Clean Water Act.84  Because 
the sources are smaller and more diverse, however, the stormwa-
ter permit process is far more convoluted and sprawling than the 
NPDES program governing industrial effluent—a feature that 
might prevent some stormwater sources from understanding 
their legal obligation to apply for a permit.85  See Figure 2.86 
                                                 
80 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-240, STORM WATER 
POLLUTION: INFORMATION NEEDED ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF PERMITTING OIL AND GAS 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 6–7 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d05240.pdf [hereinafter GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION]. 
81 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations 
for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 122–24 (1990)) (promulgating phase I regulations); Amendment to Requirements for 
National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) Permits for Storm Water Dis-
charges Under Section 402(p)(6) of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (Aug. 7, 
1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 124 (1995) (promulgating phase II regulations). 
82 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(3) (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (b)(14) (1990). 
83 See generally Amendment to Requirements for National Pollutant Discharge 
Eliminating System (NPDES) Permits for Storm Water Discharges Under Section 
402(p)(6) of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (Aug. 7, 1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 122, 124 (1995)). 
84 GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 55, at 12. 
85 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1) (2000). 
86 GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION, supra note 80, at 11. 
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Figure 2: Activities Covered under Phase I and II of the NPDES Storm Water 
Program 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-240, Storm Water Pollution: Information 
Needed on the Implications of Permitting Oil and Gas Construction Activities 11 (Feb. 
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05240.pdf. 
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Second, in an attempt to develop a close analog to the nu-
merical effluent requirements in the industrial effluent NPDES 
program, stormwater NPDES permits also identify compliance 
requirements, although these almost always take the form of site 
controls and other narrative, rather than numerical require-
ments.87  In the stormwater program, each of the three different 
types of sources of stormwater discharges—construction, munici-
pal, and industry—are required to adopt a series of BMPs or the 
equivalent to minimize the runoff of pollutants on site in order to 
be in compliance with the permit system.88  Because of sampling 
difficulties, numerical effluent limits for the runoff are the excep-
tion rather than the rule in stormwater permits.89  Even for de-
graded waters subject to TMDLs, any added monitoring that 
might be required for stormwater runoff may provide only lim-
ited information because sampling is restricted to the pollutants 
that cause the segment to degrade.90  Although multiple types of 
permits are available, in most situations, stormwater sources 
avail themselves of a more flexible, “general” permit option.91  
Along with their general permit application, the discharger sub-
mits its Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) that 
identifies sources of pollution on site and identifies the BMPs 
that it will install and maintain.92  In selecting BMPs, the dis-
charger selects from a menu of options devised by the EPA or, in 
some cases, the states or locales for their particular facility.93  
For example, the regulated party will generally identify struc-
tural BMPs, such as fences and impoundments that minimize 
runoff, and describe how they will be installed.94  The Plan must 
also include nonstructural BMPs, like good housekeeping prac-
tices, that require the source to manage the site in a way to 
minimize the opportunity for pollutants to be exposed to storm-
water runoff.95  This Plan and the accompanying BMPs consti-
tute the compliance requirements for the stormwater discharger 
and is essentially the analog to the numeric effluent limits listed 
                                                 
87 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). 
88 See generally EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 1–4. 
89 See id. at 1. 
90 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 420.32-420.36 (2004). 
91 Bonni Kaufman, Lawrence R. Liebesman & Rafe Petersoen, Regulation of Storm-
water Pollution: An Area of Increasing Importance to the Construction Industry, MONDAQ 
BUSINESS BRIEFING, Oct. 14, 2005, available at  
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=35276&lastestnews=1; EPA, OVERVIEW OF 
THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-1. 
92 See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3; 
EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 11. 
93 EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15. 
94 See, e.g., EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 5-4 to 
5-5. 
95 See, e.g., Kaufman et al., supra note 91. 
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for industrial effluents in the Code of Federal Regulations.96 
Third and even more different from the industrial effluent 
permits is the EPA’s struggle to develop an analog for the vital 
self-monitoring requirement.  In contrast to the end-of-the-pipe 
monitor installed for sampling industrial effluent, there is simply 
no easy or straightforward way to develop a self-monitoring sys-
tem for sampling stormwater runoff.97  Rather than depart from 
the traditional NPDES model and develop some different method 
for externally measuring runoff or permittee compliance, the 
EPA requires facilities to continue to “self-monitor” through peri-
odic onsite inspections that are documented in the companies’ 
onsite records.98  Typically, general stormwater discharge per-
mits do not require any quantitative monitoring of runoff to test 
the effectiveness of site controls.99  Instead, only a subset of dis-
chargers are actually required to take samples and an even 
smaller subset of those sources must actually take quantitative 
samples (as opposed to visual samples); moreover, as described in 
detail below, the permittee enjoys discretion in when and how to 
sample.100 
B.  Implementation of the Stormwater Discharge Program: 
Running Face-first into the Information Constraints 
On its face, the extension of the industrial effluent NPDES 
permit system to stormwater sources is a logical one:  Like an 
operating industry, the stormwater source must “do their best” to 
minimize the runoff of pollutants into drains and self-monitor 
their own compliance with these “do your best [management 
practices]” commitments.101  But under the surface, there are 
dramatic differences between these two parallel permit systems, 
especially with regard to the information available to regulators 
who oversee compliance.  Under the traditional NPDES permit 
system, the regulator overcomes the regulated party’s superior 
access to information by specifying the regulatory requirements 
with precision and requiring the source to install monitors that 
take samples at regular intervals.102  Although some cheating 
still takes place, this system overcomes asymmetrical informa-
tion problems with respect to compliance by instituting a moni-
                                                 
96 40 C.F.R. §§ 420–471.106 (2004). 
97 See generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 
5-20 to 5-21. 
98 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 21–22; EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE 
STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-4. 
99 See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 3. 
100 See EPA, NPDES, supra note 3, at §§ 3.2.6.1, 3.2.6.2. 
101 See id. at 15. 
102 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314 (2000). 
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toring or oversight system that provides almost no operator dis-
cretion.103 
Stormwater permits attempt to adopt similar requirements 
in keeping with the NPDES prototype, but the added scientific 
uncertainties of stormwater runoff do not allow for easy analogs.  
As a result, there are three vital differences in implementation of 
the stormwater NPDES program that leave much superior in-
formation, and hence compliance discretion with the discharger.  
First, unlike industrial pipes that carry wastes from their facto-
ries out to receiving waters, the physical presence of covered 
stormwater discharge sources is less visible or obvious.  Thus, 
particularly for some industrial and construction sources, if a 
stormwater source does not self-report and apply for a permit, 
the probability of detecting it is much lower than the traditional 
NPDES permit system.  The second major difference is the per-
mittee’s role in selecting the “do your best” compliance require-
ments.104  The selection of BMPs and their embodiment in a lar-
ger pollution prevention plan can introduce ambiguity into the 
requirements if the permittee is clever about drafting the re-
quirements in general terms.  Third and most importantly, there 
are only loose self-monitoring requirements and these leave the 
source with considerable discretion.105  This exacerbates the prob-
lems of asymmetrical information involved in the already am-
biguous compliance requirements, leaving the regulator even 
more handicapped in ensuring compliance and the regulated 
source less concerned about the possibility of meaningful en-
forcement.  Each of these challenges is elaborated in detail below. 
1. Identifying Stormwater Sources in Need of Permitting 
Both the NPDES industrial and stormwater programs de-
pend on the regulated party to self-report their existence and ap-
ply for a permit.106  The failure of sources to self-identify has been 
a problem that has plagued industrial effluent regulation; how-
ever, the problem may be far worse for some stormwater sources, 
particularly from industrial and construction sites that can be 
more obscure.  As long as there is a low probability of regulators 
identifying and catching stormwater sources compared to sources 
of industrial effluent, then compliance with the stormwater 
NPDES program can be expected to be lower than compliance 
with the industrial NPDES program.  For a number of stormwa-
ter sources—construction being the most notorious—one can ex-
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 See EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15. 
105 See id. 
106 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2000). 
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pect a great deal of slippage to occur between those sources who 
should be covered by a permit and those who actually make the 
effort to apply. 
Evidence suggests that many industrial and construction 
stormwater sources are failing to self-report and hence remain 
unpermitted and unregulated.107  In Maine, less than twenty per-
cent of the stormwater sources that fall within the regulatory ju-
risdiction of the federal stormwater program actually applied for 
permits before 2005—more than a decade after the federal regu-
lations were promulgated.108  Yet there is no record of enforce-
ment action taken by Maine against the unpermitted sources 
during that interim period.109  Indeed, in the one enforcement ac-
tion brought by citizens in Maine for an unpermitted discharge, 
the source claimed ignorance of the stormwater program.110  In 
Washington, the state Department of Ecology speculates that be-
tween ten and twenty-five percent of all businesses covered by 
the federal stormwater permit program are actually permitted.111 
In response to this problem, the EPA appears to be targeting 
enforcement against stormwater sources that do not have per-
mits.  In several cases, the EPA pursued regulated industries 
that failed to apply for stormwater permits.112  The EPA has also 
brought enforcement actions against at least three construction 
companies for failing to apply for a stormwater permit for their 
construction runoff.113  Such enforcement actions help to make 
the stormwater program more visible and give the appearance of 
a higher probability of enforcement associated with non-
compliance.  Nevertheless, the non-intuitive features of needing a 
permit to discharge stormwater, coupled with a rational percep-
tion of a low probability of being caught, likely encourage some 
                                                 
107 There is also evidence of creative compliance to avoid triggering the permit re-
quirements. In a study by the GAO of the implications of the stormwater NPDES permit 
program for oil and gas construction activities, one facility conceded that it actually broke 
their operations into smaller sites to avoid triggering the five acre minimum for Phase I 
construction stormwater permit requirements.  See, e.g., GAO, STORM WATER POLLUTION, 
supra note 80, at 13-14. 
108 See John Richardson, Maine Makes it Clear: Watch your Stormwater; Businesses 
are Being Warned About Meeting the Rules on Polluted Runoff, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 
Nov. 28, 2005, at A1 (in Maine, 330 businesses applied for stormwater permits in the 
state; approximately 1500 facilities in the state are likely to be covered by that program). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Robert McClure, Stormwater Bill Raises Concern, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Feb. 25, 2004, at B1. 
112 See, e.g., Press Release, EPA, EPA Orders Oakland Facility to Comply with its 
Stormwater Permit, (June 22, 2005) (on file with Chapman Law Review); Kaufman, et al., 
supra note 91. 
113 See Press Release, EPA, Three NH Companies Agree to Pay Fine to Settle EPA 
Complaint; Case is Part of EPA Push to Improve Compliance with Stormwater Regula-
tions (Aug. 10, 2004) (on file with Chapman Law Review). 
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sources to fail to enter the system at all. 
2. Prescribing Compliance requirements 
In contrast to the numerical limits listed in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations for industrial effluent, stormwater sources de-
sign their own pollution plan for minimizing pollutants in their 
stormwater runoff.114  This involves two steps, both of which can 
involve significant amounts of discretion that favor the regulated 
party. 
First, the source must evaluate the site for problematic pol-
lutants; but where the regulated party does not have specific 
knowledge or data, they need only offer “estimates” and “predic-
tions” of the types of pollutants that might be present at the 
site.115  See Figure 3.  These requirements are unlikely to lead 
regulated parties to rise to the occasion of conducting a rigorous 
site assessment.  Instead, these types of nebulous informational 
demands leave regulated parties with incentives to avoid expen-
sive sampling that will only have the potential to increase their 
compliance obligations.  With the exception of visible features, 
the deferential site investigation requirements, paired with the 
parties’ asymmetrical access to information, allow them to de-
scribe site conditions in ways that largely escape accountability.  
Given this discretion, ignorance regarding the site conditions will 
generally be bliss. 
                                                 
114 See generally EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 15. 
115 See EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3, V-3; 
supra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: EPA’s Required Description of the Site  
The description of potential pollutant sources must include: 
• A map of the facility indicating the areas which drain to each storm water dis-
charge point 
• An indication of the industrial activities which occur in each drainage area 
• A prediction of the pollutants which are likely to be present in the storm water 
• A description of the likely sources of pollutants from the site 
• An inventory of materials that may be exposed to storm water 
• The history of spills and leaks of toxic or hazardous materials for the last 
three years. 
The measures and controls to prevent or minimize pollution of storm water 
must include: 
• Good housekeeping or upkeep of industrial areas exposed to storm water 
• Preventative maintenance of storm water controls and other facility equipment 
• Spill prevention and response procedures to minimize the potential for and 
the impact of spills 
• Test all outfalls to ensure that there are no illicit discharges 
• Training of employees on pollution prevention measures and controls, and re-
cord keeping. 
The permit also requires that facilities: 
• Identify areas with a high potential for erosion and the stabilization measures 
or structural controls to be used to limit erosion in these areas 
• Implement traditional storm water management measures (oil/water separa-
tors, vegetative swales, detention ponds, etc.) where they are appropriate for 
the site. 
 
Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, IV-3 to 
IV-4 (June 1996) (summarizing applicable regulatory requirements), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf. 
 
Second, sources must then develop a pollution prevention 
plan that best accomplishes reductions in pollutant loads at that 
particular site, a role that again allows them to capitalize on 
their asymmetric information.116  See Figure 4.  In this setting, a 
rational actor can be expected to choose BMPs and develop a pol-
lution prevention plan that is as inexpensive as possible with the 
lowest amount of maintenance and oversight, rather than a plan 
that is especially effective at reducing polluted runoff.  Despite 
the EPA’s instructions to consider a laundry list of considerations 
that will help the facility settle on the most effective pollution 
plan,117 regulated parties are likely to look harder at the cost side 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-3; 
infra Figure 4. 
117 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 20. 
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of the ledger in determining how to design their compliance obli-
gations.  Indeed, there are no obvious benefits or extra credit for 
particularly vigorous or effective plans.  Unless the source can 
figure out a way to eliminate all pollutant threats and be eligible 
for a “no exposure” waiver,118 their extra effort will be unre-
warded and unnoticed.  In such a setting, doing the bare mini-
mum is the most rational response. 
 
                                                 
118 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(g) (2004). 
Figure 4: EPA’s BMP Identification  
Requirements 
Plans are required to contain a description of the 
controls and measures to prevent or minimize pol-
lution of storm water and a specific schedule with 
interim milestones as to when measures and con-
trols will be implemented. The measures and con-
trols to prevent and minimize pollution of storm 
water must include: 
• Good housekeeping in industrial areas 
exposed to storm water 
• Preventative maintenance of storm water 
controls and other facility equipment 
• Spill prevention and response procedures 
to minimize the potential for and the im-
pact of 
• Training of employees on pollution pre-
vention measures and record keeping 
• Identification of areas with a high poten-
tial for erosion and the stabilization 
measures or structural controls to be 
used to limit erosion 
• Implementation of traditional storm wa-
ter management measures (oil/water 
separators, vegetative swales, detention 
ponds, etc.) where they are appropriate 
for the site. 
 
Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE 
STORMWATER PROGRAM, VI-4 (June 1996) (summarizing 
applicable regulatory requirements), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf. 
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In developing the terms of their pollution prevention plan, ra-
tional facilities are more likely to develop ambiguous compliance 
requirements that leave them with discretion in determining 
compliance.119  Rather than require sampling and measurements 
of pollutants on-site, “routine” or “regularly scheduled” visual in-
spections will be preferred.120  These types of wishy-washy stan-
dards allow regulated parties to argue that they are in compli-
ance in the unlikely event that the one regulator in the state 
assigned to stormwater runoff actually conducts a site investiga-
tion.121 
The EPA does not anticipate or make much effort to curb 
this rational choice behavior by sources to maximize their com-
pliance discretion.  Instead, the EPA describes many of the per-
mit requirements in general terms that afford even greater dis-
cretion to regulated parties.  For example, the EPA commands 
the regulated party to “implement any additional BMPs that are 
economically reasonable and appropriate in light of current in-
dustry practice, and are necessary to eliminate or reduce pollut-
ants in . . . stormwater discharges.”122  In instructing dischargers 
on the trigger events that require them to update their pollution 
plans, the EPA similarly provides “loophole” terms that allow 
many sources to escape this responsibility simply by interpreting 
the ambiguous terms broadly: 
You must review, and amend your SWPPP as appropriate 
whenever there is: construction or a change in design, operation 
or maintenance at your facility such that these situations have a 
significant impact on the discharge, or potential for discharge, of 
pollutants from your facility; [or] whenever your routine inspec-
tion or compliance evaluation determines deficiencies in your 
BMPs . . . . 123 
Perhaps to make its requirement nevertheless appear rigid, 
the EPA then demands that these modifications to SWPPPs 
“must be made within 14 calendar days after discovery, observa-
tion or event requiring a SWPPP modification.”124  So the facility 
has relatively free reign—aside from obvious disasters—to decide 
                                                 
119 Facility operators, in preparing a SWPPP, “must include [BMPs], economically 
reasonable and appropriate in light of current industry practices, that are selected, de-
signed, installed, implemented and maintained in accordance with good engineering prac-
tices to eliminate or reduce all pollutants in [their] discharge . . . .”  Such language gives 
facility operators flexibility wide latitude in determining compliance.  See, e.g., EPA, 
NPDES, supra note 3, at 15. 
120 Id. at 20, 132. 
121 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
122 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 23. 
123 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. 
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when to update the plan, but once it makes this decision to up-
date, it must do so in fourteen days. 
The extent of regulator oversight in reviewing these pollu-
tion plans is also likely to vary tremendously, providing still 
more room for permittee discretion in locales where regulatory 
review is limited.125  In states or locales where the interest or 
administrative resources are low, the regulator is likely to only 
review the facial adequacy of the plan and not conduct a corre-
sponding site investigation.126  Therefore, if problems are not ad-
dressed by the facility in their plan, pollution problems may 
never be redressed or caught at all by the EPA, state, or local 
agencies.  Due to the source’s asymmetrical information in pre-
paring the plan, a regulator is substantially handicapped in en-
suring that the plan captures the “best” that the source can do in 
terms of management practices. 
Allowing regulated parties who enjoy private advantages in 
accessing information to both identify the problems and imple-
ment what they believe is the best solution, without clear exter-
nal measures of accountability, erects a regulatory system that 
creates perverse incentives for ignorance and keeps regulated 
parties largely unaccountable to regulators and the public.  Only 
regulated parties will know if the potential sources of pollution 
on their facility have been adequately identified.127  Only they 
will know whether the plan provides the best way to address 
these problems, and they will have far more access to information 
to determine their own compliance with the plan.  Finally, to the 
extent that there is much discretion in determining compliance, 
they will enjoy the role of arbiter. 
Conversely, if the regulated party invests resources measur-
ing pollutant loads on their property, they are creating a paper 
trail that puts them at risk of greater regulation.  Under the 
EPA’s regulations, a regulated party “must provide a summary of 
existing stormwater discharge sampling data previously taken at 
[its] facility,” but if there are no data or sampling efforts, then 
                                                 
125 Currently, the public is generally not involved in the review of a facility’s SWPPP 
and there is no formal opportunity for public participation.  See, e.g., Caltrans, Water 
Quality NewsFlash (Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/env/ 
stormwater/publicat/newsflash/9_26_05.pdf  (discussing the potential effect of recent U.S. 
appellate decisions on current stormwater permit practice, which is not to provide the 
public with an opportunity to review SWPPPs). 
126 But see Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (suggesting the EPA is encouraging the 
states to conduct their own investigations). 
127 The regulated party is expected to identify these problems, but there is no check 
on the amount of effort they use to inventory possible problems or whether they err on the 
side or over- or under-inclusiveness in this estimation.  See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra 
note 3, at 18. 
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the facility is off the hook.128  Quantitative measures can be in-
criminating, particularly in a regulatory setting where the regu-
lator is willing to settle for estimates.  Real data documenting 
problems provides regulators with evidence that there may be 
problematic sources of pollutants in stormwater runoff, leading 
them to insist on more controls than for a comparable, unsam-
pled site.129 
3. Ensuring Compliance 
The regulated party is also responsible for self-monitoring its 
compliance.130  But unlike the NPDES program where there are 
quantitative measures of compliance, the self-inspections and 
self-monitoring requirements are general and leave much greater 
discretion that favor the regulated party.131 
As part of their pollution plan, all stormwater sources are 
required to self-inspect their facilities,132 but like the discretion 
afforded to them in most other aspects of devising these plans, 
the inspection requirements are also ambiguous and quite defer-
ential.133  See Figure 5.  Sources are required to keep records of 
the inspections, but this appears to be the outer limit of their ac-
countability for these inspections.134  Short of having a compli-
ance officer visit the site, there is effectively no way to ensure 
that the regulated party is complying with their BMPs and other 
regulatory requirements in a rigorous way.135  As a result, in the 
current design of the stormwater program, a regulated source 
can do a poor job implementing BMPs without much, if any, ac-
countability.  For example, if a source is supposed to build a silt-
fence as required by their pollution prevention plan, there is lit-
tle to keep them from building one that meets only the minimum 
requirements.  During the ensuing years as the fence deterio-
rates, the fact that it is still standing might be counted by the 
source as adequate for purposes of complying with its stormwater 
pollution prevention plan.136 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., id. at 20; see also EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra 
note 2, at V-2 (showing same requirement for construction permit). 
129 See generally Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (indicating that the EPA is now 
cracking down on companies that have not obtained permits). 
130 EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 24. 
131 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2)-(b)(2) (2000) (outlining requirements for compli-
ance under NPDES) with EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 26 (outlining requirements 
for self-compliance under EPA regulations). 
132 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 21. 
133 EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at IV-4; see supra 
Figure 5. 
134 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 22. 
135 See generally id. at 21–22 (illustrating the lax requirements of self-inspection and 
employee training of inspection teams). 
136 Cf. Kaufman et al., supra note 91 (“For example, a silt fence that sags for several 
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Federal regulations do supplement these self-inspections 
with sampling requirements for a subset of sources, yet even 
these more data-driven requirements still leave regulated parties 
with some discretion.137  Most industrial facilities, for example, 
are required to conduct a visual inspection of a grab sample of 
their stormwater runoff on a quarterly basis and describe the 
visual appearance of the sample in a document that is kept on 
file at the site.138  Certainly, a visual sample is better than noth-
ing, but the requirement not only allows the source some discre-
tion in determining how and when to take the sample (explained 
below), but also discretion in how to describe the sample.139  A 
smaller list of facilities must actually quantitatively sample 
listed pollutants in their stormwater runoff on a quarterly ba-
sis.140  Yet while the EPA’s sampling guidelines specify that these 
                                                                                                                 
days in-between inspections may be considered by [the] EPA to be a violation for each day 
that it is not fixed, despite the fact that under the SWPPP the fence is not required to be 
inspected during that several day period.  Labeling such an event a permit violation (sub-
ject to up to $27,500 of fines per day) would appear inconsistent with the notion that in-
spections, followed by maintenance and repair of problems identified in the inspection are 
fundamental to BMPs.”). 
137 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 27. 
138 See, e.g., id. at 28; EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, 
at VI-5. 
139 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 29 (allowing a regulated party to 
visually monitor just one outfall if others are believed to “discharge substantially identical 
effluents . . . .”). 
140 See, e.g., id. at 93-94. 
Figure 5: EPA’s Inspection/Site Compliance 
Evaluation Requirements 
Facility personnel must inspect the plant equipment and indus-
trial areas on a regular basis.  At least once a year or more a 
thorough site compliance evaluation must be performed by facil-
ity personnel. Personnel conducting the evaluation shall: 
• Look for evidence of, or the potential for, pollutants entering 
the drainage system 
• Evaluate the performance of pollution prevention measures 
• Revise the pollution prevention plan based on the results 
of the evaluation in order to reduce 
• the discharge of pollutants 
• Document both the routine inspections and the annual site 
compliance evaluation in a report. 
 
Quoted in EPA, EPA 833-R-96-008, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER 
PROGRAM, IV-4 (June 1996) (summarizing applicable regulatory re-
quirements), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf.  
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samples should be taken within thirty minutes after the storm 
begins, and only if it is the first storm in three days, that is the 
limit of the restrictions governing sampling.141  The owner’s per-
sonnel determines which storm they will use for their monitoring 
requirement and at which point during that first half-hour to 
take the grab sample.142  This is not to suggest that owners will 
cheat.  However, the guidelines—in some cases by necessity—
provide sources with relatively wide bounds for conducting this 
sampling.143  If the owners have an interest in measuring only 
low pollutant levels in their samples, these guidelines provide 
them the discretion to cherry-pick storms and, to some extent, 
times during which to collect the sample during a storm.144  Al-
though municipalities are required to do more extensive sam-
pling of runoff and enjoy less sampling discretion,145 even mu-
nicipalities are allowed to select what they believe are their most 
representative outfalls for purposes of monitoring pollutant 
loads. 
Even in cases where the party reports high pollution loads in 
these quarterly samples, the source is generally required only to 
use its discretion to amend its plan to do better.146  Given the 
enormous variability in storms and stormwater runoff concentra-
tions, even within the first thirty minutes of any storm event, it 
is no wonder the EPA shies away from attaching serious conse-
quences to the results of an annual or even a quarterly grab 
sample of stormwater.  At the same time, however, the lack of 
real consequences that flow from high pollutant loads transforms 
the already weak program into little more than a paper tiger.  At 
the end of the day, sources only need to document the steps and 
requirements they have taken to comply with the guidelines, 
rather than employ rigorous or innovative improvements to the 
site that actually succeed in minimizing pollutant runoff in storm 
flows.147 
Making matters worse, there appears to be very limited 
regulatory resources; for example, in Oregon, there is only one 
inspector to oversee compliance with the stormwater program.148  
                                                 
141 See  id. at 33. 
142 See id. 
143 See, e.g., id. (explaining that sources are obliged to provide general information 
on the storm event itself when submitting their sample). 
144 See, e.g., id. at 33-34. 
145 See, e.g., EPA, OVERVIEW OF THE STORMWATER PROGRAM, supra note 2, at VIII-1. 
146 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3 at 10, 30, 34. 
147 See id. at 44. 
148 Libby Tucker, Oregon and Washington to Release Tougher Standards for Storm-
water Permits, DAILY J. COMMERCE (Portland, Or.), Dec. 12, 2005, at 2 (reporting that 
Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality only has “one full-time employee inspect-
ing the 1,500 [stormwater] sites under permit . . . .”); McClure, supra note 111, at B1 (re-
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And yet even with considerable regulatory resources dedicated to 
stormwater source inspections, it is not clear how well inspectors 
could independently assess compliance with the permit require-
ments.  For example, some of the plan’s requirements will specify 
“good housekeeping” practices that should take place routinely at 
the facility from day-to-day.149  Whether or how well these prac-
tices are followed cannot be assessed in a single inspection.  
While a particularly non-compliant facility might be apparent 
from a brief, one-shot visual inspection, a facility that is mildly 
sloppy, or at least has periods during which it is not careful, can 
escape detection on one of these pre-announced audits.  Facilities 
also know best the pollutants they generate and how or whether 
those pollutants might make contact with stormwater.  Inspec-
tors might be able to notice some of these problems, but because 
they do not have the same level of information about the opera-
tions of the facility, they can be expected to miss some problems. 
A final compliance concern—which goes both to the facility’s 
incentives to be in compliance as well as to the realities of en-
forcement in terms of the probability of being caught in viola-
tion—is the seeming impossibility of using citizen suits to enforce 
stormwater permit requirements.  To the extent that states and 
locales do not oversee stormwater permit programs with vigor, 
citizens may be the only realistic hope of providing some mean-
ingful enforcement to the program.  Citizens have, in fact, sued 
facilities for unpermitted stormwater discharges:150 this is a 
straightforward process because citizens need only verify that the 
facility is covered and lacks a permit.151  Overseeing facility com-
pliance with stormwater permit requirements is a different story, 
however, and citizens are stymied at this stage of ensuring facil-
ity compliance.  Citizens can access a facility’s pollution preven-
tion plan, but only if they request the plan from the facility in 
writing.152  Moreover, the facility is given the authority to make a 
determination—apparently without regulator oversight—of 
whether the plan contains confidential business information and 
thus cannot be disclosed to citizens.153  But, even if the facility 
                                                                                                                 
porting that state employees available to inspect stormwater discharges in Washington 
are “thin”).  But see California EPA, California Water Boards, ENFORCEMENT REPORT, 
Feb. 23, 2005, at 11, 13-14, available at  
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/legislative/docs/2004/enforcementrpt2004_13385o.pdf (out-
lining considerable enforcement activity under the stormwater discharge program). 
149 See supra Part II.A.2. 
150 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 108, at A1. 
151 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). 
152 See, e.g., EPA, 2006 MSGP, supra note 3, at 25; see also supra note 125 (noting 
how citizens do not have a formal opportunity to review the adequacy of facilities’ 
SWPPPs). 
153 Id. at 26. 
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sends the plan to the citizens, it will be nearly impossible for 
them to independently assess whether the facility is in compli-
ance unless the citizens station telescopes, conduct air surveil-
lance of the site, or are allowed to access the facility’s records of 
its own self-inspections.154  Moreover, to the extent that the 
stormwater outfalls are on the facility’s property, citizens might 
not be able to conduct their own sampling without trespassing.  
In any event, and as mentioned above, the permit requirements 
are so flexible that an arguably large range of activities with 
tremendously variable impacts on water quality are allowed un-
der existing permit requirements.  Thus, renting telescopes 
would not be worth the trouble because the facility could likely 
argue that its small eroding impoundment basin is nevertheless 
a functioning basin as that term is specified in the general menu 
of BMPs.  In most cases, then, the disputes will ultimately de-
volve to arguments about whether the facility has complied with 
the minimum recordkeeping requirements in these settings, the 
facility will not only have private information to assist them in 
defending their compliance, but may be able to deprive the citi-
zens of standing if they can amend their records after the fact.155 
III. REFORM 
The federal stormwater NPDES program is a disappoint-
ment.  Despite its extravagant wrappings, underneath the links, 
guidance documents, and studies is a program that is designed in 
a way that does not seem cognizant of existing information prob-
lems and that could exacerbate the tendency of owners to keep 
information to themselves. 
Reforming this program requires acknowledging the unique 
information constraints that afflict it. Such a reform does not re-
quire scrapping the existing program, but would involve design-
ing and implementing controls in ways that confront and over-
come some of the existing asymmetries in information. 
In this section, three possibilities for reform—some more 
promising than others—are considered. 
A.  The Role of State and Local Governments 
Because it requires controls on land use, the EPA’s stormwa-
ter discharge program strikes at a target that is traditionally 
                                                 
154 Cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that aerial 
surveillance by the government does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
155 Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998) (finding that 
the relief sought would not redress losses caused by steel manufacturer’s violations and 
therefore, the plaintiff “failed to satisfy redressability requirement for standing”). 
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within the province of state and even more likely local govern-
ment regulation.156  Indeed, it is possible that part of the reason 
for the EPA’s loosely structured permit program is its concern 
about intruding on the province of state and local governments, 
particularly given their superior expertise in regulating land use 
practices. 
In theory, it is perfectly plausible that some state and local 
governments will step into the void and overcome some of the in-
formation problems built into the design of the federal stormwa-
ter discharge program.  If local or state governments required 
mandatory monitoring or more rigorous and less ambiguous 
BMPs, they would make considerable progress in developing a 
more successful stormwater control program.  In fact, some 
states and locales have instituted programs that take these steps 
and began to confront and overcome the problems of asymmetri-
cal and uncertain information more directly.  For example, Cali-
fornia appears to lead all other states in aggressive stormwater 
discharge programs, including implementing greatly expanded 
monitoring requirements.157  Municipalities are also blazing new 
trails.158  Notably, Stafford, New Jersey uses innovative munici-
pal stormwater systems that filter the runoff before discharging 
it back into aquifers.159  Another town in Michigan is developing 
cutting-edge techniques for tracking illicit connections into the 
municipal stormwater system.160 
Despite these bursts of enthusiasm, most state, local gov-
ernments and business communities have not been receptive to 
regulating stormwater discharges; therefore, it is unlikely that 
they will take action to repair the EPA’s failing federal pro-
                                                 
156 See A. Dan Tarlock, Contested Landscapes and Local Voice, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 513, 526 (2000) (discussing the proposition that “water law is an exclusive state 
function”). 
157 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, FACT SHEET 
FOR WATER QUALITY ORDER 99-08-DWQ, NPDES GENERAL PERMIT FOR STORMWATER 
STORM WATER DISCHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY (GENERAL 
PERMIT): SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 34, available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/stormwtr/ 
docs/9908_factsheet.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).  The States of Washington and Mary-
land also have aggressive programs.  See, e.g., Washington Department of Ecology, Water 
Quality Program, Stormwater, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/stormwater/ (last vis-
ited May 12, 2006); Maryland Department of the Environment, Maryland’s Stormwater 
Management Program, http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/WaterPrograms/Sediment 
andStormwater/index.asp (last visited May 12, 2006). 
158 See, e.g., Prince George’s County, Maryland, PRD Stormwater Management De-
tails Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.co.pg.md.us/Government/AgencyIndex/ 
DER/PRD/stormwater_management.asp (last visited May 12, 2006). 
159 See Erik Larsen, Stafford Floods Lot to Show off System, ASBURY PARK PRESS 
(Asbury Park, N.J.), Mar. 6, 2004, at B1. 
160 See Dean C. Tuomari & Susan Thompson, Sherlocks of Stormwater, WATER ENV’T 
& TECH., May 1, 2005, at 49, available at 2005 WLNR 8150301. 
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gram.161  Because they involve some expense, stormwater dis-
charge requirements can increase resident taxes,162 anger busi-
nesses,163 and strain already busy regulatory staff.164  The dearth 
of scientific evidence connecting stormwater controls with water 
quality improvements makes implementation of these programs 
seem even less compelling. The president of a builders’ league in 
New Jersey quipped that: “[t]here’s no scientific background for 
these regulations . . . They seem to be into junk science.”165  In 
any event, a fair number of states have already passed “no more 
stringent” laws which legislatively preclude them from taking 
added actions to improve on the federal stormwater program, 
even if they had the will to do so.166  Local and state government 
disinterest in stormwater discharge regulation thus helps to ex-
plain why there are many stormwater sources out of compliance 
with the stormwater discharge permit program, at least in the 
few states that have gone on record.167 
Interestingly, for at least some of the states and localities 
that have taken leadership roles in repairing the federal storm-
water program, there appears to be particularly compelling water 
quality benefits that accrue to them that might not be available 
to other states or locales.  Innovations in recharging municipal 
stormwater takes place in a New Jersey town that is adjacent to 
a recreational bay that was suffering from poor water quality.168  
“Sewer sleuths” traced illicit connections in a town that was at-
tempting to transform its adjacent, degraded river into a water 
body fit for fishing and swimming.169  California and cities like 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 148, at 2 (quoting Oregon agency staff member as 
saying: “‘Compared to other states, we’re doing pretty well as far as the requirements.  No 
other states outside of Washington and California have monitoring in their construction 
permits at all . . . .’”); Stormwater Woes Solutions Sought, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER (As-
bury Park, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2005, at A16 (describing lack of enthusiasm for the stormwater 
program in New Jersey); SD Stormwater Runoff Rules Survive Building Industry Test, 
CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Jan. 1, 2005, at 12 (describing unsuc-
cessful lawsuit brought by regulated parties against the San Diego Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board for their vigorous stormwater program that exceeds the federal floor) 
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. 
162 See, e.g., Jacinthia Jones, City To Assess Runoff Fee In July, COMMERCIAL 
APPEAL (Memphis, Tn.), Dec. 11, 2005, at B1. 
163 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 161, at 12. 
164 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
165 See, e.g., Thomas Barlas, New Stormwater Rules to Protect State Streams, 
McGreevey Promises, PRESS (Atlantic City, N.J.), Jan. 6, 2004, at A8. 
166 See generally Andrew Hecht, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Pro-
tection: States’ Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
105 (2004) (discussing these “no more stringent” laws). 
167 See Richardson, supra note 108, at A10; McClure, supra note 111, at B4. 
168 See Jacques Cousteau National Estuarine Research Reserve, Coastal Resources 
Toolkit: Stormwater Management, 2. Case Study: Stafford Township, NJ, http://www. 
jcnerr.org/coastal_training/toolkit/storm/case-study.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). 
169 See Tuomari & Thompson, supra note 160, at 49–50. 
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San Diego, Newport Beach, and Santa Monica enjoy a great deal 
of tourism from their ocean frontage, making their extra efforts 
to control water quality largely selfish.  The energies dedicated to 
the stormwater program by state and local governments in the 
aggregate, in fact, might actually be loosely correlated with local-
ized rewards from cleaner water quality.  When a state or locality 
does not derive direct or immediate benefits from investing re-
sources in stormwater discharge reduction, they might be less in-
clined to implement an innovative stormwater program. 
Despite the substantial role they could play in correcting the 
federal program’s insensitivity to the science constraints, many 
states and locales do not appear to be eager to implement the 
stormwater discharge programs, much less make it more strin-
gent and enforceable.  This lack of enthusiasm also makes sense 
in rational choice terms.  Stormwater discharge regulation is 
costly and politically unpopular.170  If the benefits of stormwater 
controls are not going to materialize in waters close to or of value 
to the urban area, then the costs of the program from locality’s 
standpoint are likely to outweigh its benefits.  In fact, in some 
cases an upstream town’s efforts might be perceived as benefiting 
only downstream neighbors who might attract away its taxpay-
ers with lower stormwater regulation and/or a higher water qual-
ity.171 
What is not clear is the extent to which the current federal 
program actually serves as a roadblock to innovative approaches 
at the state or local level.  The elaborate paper requirements for 
stormwater discharge permits create an infrastructure that may 
ultimately displace—both in terms of effort and framing the 
problem—other approaches to stormwater discharge control.  In-
deed, the tendency of an elaborate but failed federal program to 
effectively preempt state innovation is a familiar problem with 
the Clean Water Act: it has also been raised as a problem with 
the EPA’s obsessively methodological TMDL program.172 
Moreover, by developing such a poor federal template for 
stormwater discharge regulation, the EPA may also be setting up 
those governments that do attempt to innovate for untoward po-
litical pressure.  San Diego has already been singled out by its 
business community who argued that the county’s more rigorous 
                                                 
170 See, e.g., June F. Harrigan-Lum & Arnold L. Lum, Hawaii’s TMDL Program: Le-
gal Requirements and Environmental Realities, 15 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 12, 61 (2000). 
171  But see SUZANNE DALLMAN & THOMAS PIECHOTA, LOS ANGELES & SAN GABRIEL 
RIVERS WATERSHED COUNCIL, STORM WATER: ASSET NOT LIABILITY (1999), available at 
http://www.lasgrwc.org/publications/Stormwater.pdf (making the case that there can be 
immediate benefits to some communities in removing pollutants from stormwater). 
172 See id. at 61–62. 
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implementation of the stormwater discharge permit program vio-
lated federal law because it exceeded federal standards.173  Al-
though they lost their lawsuit against the County of San Diego,174 
undoubtedly these businesses’ discontent continues in the form of 
political pressure on elected officials and others responsible for 
implementing the stormwater program.  Finally, it is possible 
that the extensive paper requirements give the federal program 
the illusion of providing a comprehensive solution to stormwater 
runoff problems.  This regulatory mirage carries the potential to 
mislead the public and reduce the urgency of introducing more 
effective approaches to stormwater discharge controls. 
B. Mandatory, Systematic Monitoring 
Given the strong asymmetries in information that the regu-
lated facilities enjoy under the stormwater regulatory program, a 
rigorous water quality monitoring system that assesses the facili-
ties’ real progress in reducing stormwater discharges would be 
enormously beneficial, if not vital, to make the program work.175  
As described in Part II, the current federal stormwater program 
not only fails to require meaningful monitoring, but may actually 
provide disincentives for sources to conduct rigorous monitoring 
on their own. 
Holding stormwater sources accountable for the objective re-
sults of their stormwater control efforts evidenced in monitoring 
results, rather than their largely unenforceable plans, should be-
gin to overcome at least some of the problems of asymmetric in-
formation.  Indeed, monitoring may provide the only way to over-
come these information asymmetries. The monitoring approach 
also mimics the successful approach taken in the traditional 
NPDES program governing industrial effluent.  Finally, monitor-
ing could also be used to establish “default goals” that help define 
the types of stormwater discharge improvements that must take 
place in the future, while leaving it to individual sources to de-
velop the best ways to meet these challenges.176  Conversely, if 
monitoring reveals that pollutants in stormwater runoff from a 
source or cluster of sources are insignificant, then these sources 
might be expected to implement only a basic, visible type of 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 161, at 12. 
174 Id. at 12. 
175 See EPA, HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 53 (stating that “documentation and 
quantification of pollutant characteristics and effects are critical in developing an urban 
runoff pollution prevention and control plan.”). 
176 Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully 
set at what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each 
other or to third parties . . . .”). 
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structural BMP with no requirements for paperwork or self-
inspections. 
However, given the added scientific uncertainties that ac-
company the sampling of runoff, creating a meaningful monitor-
ing system for stormwater discharges will not be easy.  The vari-
ability of loadings in stormwater produce ample room for missing 
“upsets” of pollutants as well as unrepresentative hits of large 
concentrations of pollutants that give false positives.177  Unlike 
the NPDES industrial effluent program, which can involve the 
installation of end-of-the-pipe monitors that take samples at 
regular intervals, stormwater discharges occur predominantly 
during storm events and these monitors will not be able to sam-
ple runoff continuously or even at regular intervals.178  Neverthe-
less, with careful design, monitoring can provide valuable insight 
about water quality loadings from nonpoint sources—and par-
ticularly stormwater discharges—and will help isolate the worst 
problems in a water body.179 
Fortunately, the mistakes made by the current stormwater 
discharge systems are instructive in establishing this more com-
prehensive monitoring system.  In contrast to the current federal 
stormwater discharge program that defers any monitoring activ-
ity to the regulated parties, all monitoring should be done by a 
governmental agency, whether it be local, state, or federal.  Cre-
ating this centralized and unbiased monitoring system provides a 
number of benefits.  First, it allows a group of experts to develop 
a systematic monitoring plan that gets the most information for 
its investment.  Sampling locations, for example, could shift: as 
one contributor is identified and its discharges reduced, the 
monitoring could shift to other troubled locales.  Second, replac-
ing regulated parties’ unsupervised “visual” samples and spo-
radic grab samples of stormwater discharge with a sampling plan 
developed and implemented by the technical staff of an agency is 
bound to improve the reliability of sampling.  At least one study 
indicates that composite sampling (taking multiple samples over 
time) is far superior to grab samples in characterizing stormwa-
ter discharges; yet this more expensive and sophisticated moni-
toring technique is best implemented by a trained team of scien-
tists.180  Major sources of bias and incompetence, which are 
                                                 
177 See supra note 73; see generally EPA, THE USE OF BEST MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES, supra note 67, at 4–7 (explaining that pollutant measurements can be highly 
variable). 
178 See id. at 4-24 to 4-25. 
179 See, e.g., EPA, HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 53.  See also Haejin Lee & Michael 
K. Stenstrom, Utility of Stormwater Monitoring, 77 WATER ENVT. RESEARCH, May/June 
2005, at 219. 
180 See Lee & Stenstrom, supra note 179, at 225 (advocating a trained team to con-
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especially expected in the difficult job of monitoring runoff, can 
also be minimized when technical agency staff conducts the sam-
pling.  Finally, economies of scale will reduce the cost of this 
sampling since the lab and the person doing the sampling can do 
it more efficiently when they do it in “bulk.” 
In developing a monitoring program, samples should be 
taken of the stormwater discharge as well as the receiving wa-
ters.181  Together these different sampling efforts provide a rela-
tively robust view of discharge contributions and a basis for im-
posing greater controls on some facilities and lesser controls on 
others.  Due to the residual uncertainties in analyzing the sam-
ples—for example, determining the largest sources of pollutant 
loadings and what added measures might be necessary—
government regulators and scientists would also need to be em-
ployed to conduct a rigorous analysis of the sampling results.  
This analysis should then lead to added, government-specified 
controls, including requiring the stormwater to be treated if the 
loading from one or more stormwater sources continues to be 
high.  The costs of this government-sponsored sampling and 
analysis could be passed off in the price of a stormwater dis-
charge permit. 
Comprehensive monitoring would not be a complete re-
placement for the current NPDES system, but would provide a 
vital supplement to ensuring the enforceability of existing BMP 
requirements.  Because of the variability in runoff, monitoring 
will have large sources of error and periodic samples will not be 
able to provide a definitive measure of stormwater pollutant 
loads.182  Thus, even with a reliable monitoring program, storm-
water discharge permittees will still need to go on record that 
they are educated about stormwater controls and identify the 
controls they have put in place on site to minimize pollution run-
off through stormwater.  But in contrast to the current system, 
the permitees will do so knowing that there is now an external 
check on their compliance with BMPs and an incentive to make 
them truly effective. 
Implementing a full-scale monitoring program in response to 
the difficulties involved in overseeing stormwater discharges 
would also begin to redress a larger problem that has generally 
                                                                                                                 
duct composite sampling of stormwater discharges). 
181 See generally STORMWATER MONITORING COALITION, MODEL MONITORING 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, MODEL MONITORING PROGRAM FOR MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM 
SEWER SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TECHNICAL REPORT #419 (Aug. 2004), avail-
able at ftp://ftp.sccwrp.org/pub/download/PDFs/419_smc_mm.pdf; EPA, THE USE OF BEST 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 67. 
182 See id. at 4-2. 
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plagued the Clean Water Act.  In part, because of the NPDES’s 
success in circumventing the need for science in setting effluent 
standards, there has been less attention paid to water quality 
monitoring.183  Water quality monitoring is not even technically 
required by the Clean Water Act.184  Indeed, if anything, the bur-
densome features of the federal TMDL program—which apply 
when water quality monitoring reveals that the waters are de-
graded—may provide perverse incentives for states and localities 
to remain blissfully ignorant about the state of their waters.185  
Learning that a water body is polluted only increases conflicts 
between the environmentally-minded public and regulated par-
ties—conflicts that elected officials are likely to dodge.  Inept and 
nonexistent monitoring provides the recipe for keeping these 
bothersome water quality problems off the political radar. 
Given the continued apathy in water quality monitoring, the 
demand for such a comprehensive monitoring program would 
need to be a federal requirement.  One clear lesson that emerges 
from the thirty-plus years of implementation of the Clean Water 
Act is that states and locales will not conduct rigorous water 
quality monitoring without prodding.186  Moreover, the uneven 
quality of the monitoring that is done suggests that some stan-
dard federal prescriptions for monitoring are needed.187  The fed-
eral program could also identify the costs of such a monitoring 
program and suggest how the costs could be rolled over into per-
mit fees.  Indeed, to the extent that permit fees of existing 
stormwater sources provide some of the financial support for a 
monitoring system, it would make the states and locales more in-
clined to identify unpermitted sources and bring them into the 
system. 
                                                 
183 See, e.g., EPA, EPA 100-R-98-006, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 3 (July 1998), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/faca/facaall.pdf. 
184 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
185 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000); see also Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After 
Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen 
Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 395-96, 423-25 (1997) (detailing the ways in which the 
TMDL program has failed due to the EPA’s historic disinterest in the program and the 
states’ inactivity in implementing its requirements). 
186 See, e.g., PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, PEER WHITE 
PAPER: MURKY WATERS: OFFICIAL WATER QUALITY REPORTS ARE ALL WET 2 (May 1999) 
(concluding in its executive summary that “an unfortunate mix of politics, bureaucratic 
inertia and bad science means that conflicting, erroneous and manipulated sets of water 
quality data containing little accurate information on the actual condition of the nation’s 
rivers and streams are routinely reported by States and dutifully compiled by EPA for 
presentation to Congress and the public.”). 
187 Id. at 2–3. 
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C. Revitalizing Multi-media Regulation 
When considering stormwater discharge program reform, it 
is easy to be swept away by the narrow, bureaucratic framing of 
the problem that targets regulation only of those with immediate 
control over the problematic pollutants, namely the owners or 
users of the land or storm drains.  This framing is justified and 
appropriate for regulatory purposes, but it is not the only fram-
ing possible and should not be the sole approach to stormwater 
controls or water quality improvements. 
Stepping back, it is evident that several of the major “prob-
lem” sources of pollutants in stormwater runoff are widespread 
products and activities, some of which can be regulated further 
upstream at the point of manufacture.  Regulating products at 
their point of manufacture also has the enormous advantage of 
circumventing asymmetrical information problems, as well as the 
uncertainties in measuring stormwater sources’ contributions to 
runoff pollution.  If problematic sources of pollution are elimi-
nated entirely, e.g., by banning them, then at least those sources 
of pollution are no longer in need of monitoring or BMPs.  Indeed, 
such an approach capitalizes on the information that science is 
able to provide—namely the types of products and activities that 
result in the highest loadings of pollutants nationwide. 
One of the most significant products that introduces pollut-
ants through stormwater runoff is the motor vehicle.188  Vehicle 
emissions include particulates and gases that ultimately deposit 
on the land in the form of highly toxic metals and complex hydro-
carbons, like polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).189  Vehicle ex-
haust accounts for a significant portion of these pollutants that 
enter receiving waters in the form of runoff.190 
Stormwater pollution alone might not provide an adequate 
impetus to ban or substantially regulate the emissions from mo-
tor vehicles, but at the very least, it should be another reason to 
encourage the development of Low and Zero Emissions Vehicles 
(LEVs and ZEVs).  Since auto emissions have their greatest 
negative impact on the ability of localities to meet Clean Air Act 
requirements, there has already been considerable effort dedi-
cated to encourage the development of these LEVs and ZEVs, 
particularly in California.191  Yet it appears that water quality 
concerns are not currently included in the motivation to develop 
                                                 
188 See, e.g., EPA, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY, supra note 8, at 4-15 to 4-16. 
189 Id. at 4-15 to 4-16. 
190 Id. 
191 See, e.g., State of California Air Resources Board, Fact Sheet: 2003 Zero Emission 
Vehicle Program Changes, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/ 
2003zevchanges.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
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this LEV and ZEV technology.192  If water quality concerns were 
better publicized, they might provide even more momentum to 
encourage the development of these vehicles.193  Beyond subsidiz-
ing the development and mass marketing of these vehicles, the 
federal government could encourage urban areas to develop in-
centives for ZEV use in order to reduce stormwater pollutants.  It 
is too early to sketch out what these incentive programs might 
look like.  For example, an incentive program may provide 
greater federal subsidization of municipal sewage treatment 
plants with greater ZEV use in the urban corridor or reduced wa-
ter quality monitoring requirements for municipalities with 
greater ZEV fleets.  But the link between changing over to LEVs 
and ZEVs and reduced pollutant loadings is sufficiently power-
ful194 that it could be included in a rigorous stormwater discharge 
program. 
Other products that are repeat contributors to stormwater 
discharges could also be controlled at the manufacturing stage, 
most likely through the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).195  
Asphalt sealants, for example, can account for some of the toxins 
in stormwater runoff: the discovery of the demise of an endan-
gered species in Barton Springs in Austin, Texas was ultimately 
linked to a toxin released from the sealant applied to an asphalt 
parking lot uphill from the Springs.196  Currently there is effec-
tively no meaningful regulatory oversight of these types of prod-
ucts that leach dangerous toxins into bodies of water.  Under the 
TSCA, the EPA generally treats all products the same and does 
little multi-media analysis to target products that pose particu-
larly significant national risks for air or water.197  There is noth-
ing precluding the EPA from developing this type of rigor in its 
implementation of TSCA.  The EPA’s authority to prioritize and 
target products that increase pollutants in runoff—both for 
added testing and regulation—is clear from the broad language 
                                                 
192 There is some forward momentum in the State of California to examine these air-
water connections, however.  See, e.g., California Environmental Protection Agency, State 
Water Resources Control Board, Workshop—Atmospheric Deposition and Water Quality 
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/workshops/atmospheric.html. 
193 See generally California ZEV Alliance, Californians Support Zero-Emission Vehi-
cle Program 2 to 1 ZEV Alliance Urges CARB to Hold Firm on ZEV Program, 
http://www.electrifyingtimes.com/ZEV.html (noticing the disparate benefits of Zero-
Emission Vehicle Programs in California) (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
194 See California ZEV Alliance, supra note 193. 
195 See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) 
(2000). 
196 See Kevin Carmody, City Didn’t Provide All Data Needed to Assess Pool Risks, 
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 2003, at A1, A7. 
197 See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory 
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 268–69 (1991). 
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of the statute.198 
As a result, a second multi-media initiative would be for the 
EPA to identify the types of products—like asphalt sealants—
that produce widespread sources of dangerous toxins that leach 
into waters either as nonpoint pollution or through stormwater 
discharges—and investigate and potentially regulate them at the 
site of manufacture.  The EPA could require the manufacturers 
to test these products in terms of their leaching potential and re-
quire warnings on the products that alert buyers or even local or 
state officials as to their elevated toxicity, particularly relative to 
other types of asphalt sealants that prove less toxic.  States or lo-
cales, in turn, might decide to ban or tax the more toxic products. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Proper design of an environmental regulatory system re-
quires attention to the entrenched limitations in scientific and 
technical information that are needed to define and redress the 
problem.  Information asymmetries can also be especially prob-
lematic in developing enforceable regulatory requirements. 
Unfortunately, the federal stormwater permit program fails 
to take these information constraints into account.  Instead, it re-
flexively maps the regulation of stormwater discharges onto the 
NPDES program, which was designed to regulate pollutants in 
industrial effluent.  Because of the program’s failure to accom-
modate the new, added uncertainties related to stormwater, the 
effort to force-fit stormwater regulation into the existing permit 
model runs the risk of transforming a very successful model pro-
gram for industrial effluent into an entirely unsuccessful pro-
gram for stormwater runoff. 
We can do better.  External, comprehensive monitoring of 
waters is long overdue, as are more rigorous controls of pervasive 
sources of water pollution, like automobile exhaust and asphalt 
sealants.  If we are to make real, meaningful progress on reduc-
ing pollutants from stormwater discharge, these and other inno-
vative programs that identify and work around information con-
straints are essential. 
 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(1)(A) (2000) (providing the EPA with authority to 
mandate added testing if the chemical “may present” a risk or hazard). 
